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Abstract: One of the most effective means to combat housing discrimination 
is statutory prohibition for protected minority classes. The US Federal Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) represents a model for such statutory prohibitions. The 
FHA prohibits such discrimination by either public (state and local government 
agencies) or private (landlords) actors on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, sex, family status or disability. Following a Supreme Court decision in 
the 1970s, proof of intent to discriminate is necessary to bring an action under 
the US Constitution's 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses. However, no such intent need be proved to sue under the FHA. 
Federal Appeals Courts sustained dozens of lawsuits claiming discrimination 
based simply on disparate impact of government or private action on one of 
the aforementioned protected classes. In 2014, the Supreme Court approved 
such a theory even though disparate impact is not mentioned in the FHA. 
However, the Court hedged the application of disparate impact with so many 
caveats and restrictions that many federal courts have now ruled against 
parties bringing disparate impact claims of discrimination under the FHA. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States has struggled with discrimination in housing and the providing 
affordable, workforce or low-income housing for decades. This article summarises 
and analyses the problems and opportunities created in large measure by federal 
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and state courts together with guidance provided by the US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to address these issues and problems. 
First, this article addresses the problem of discrimination in housing and the use 
of disparate impact claims as a remedy under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) in 
light of the recent clarification provided by the US Supreme Court in its decision 
in Inclusive Communities v Texas Department of Community Affairs. There 
follows a discussion of recent HUD guidance by way of administrative rule, 
together with a summary of how federal courts address discrimination in housing 
following the decision in Inclusive Communities. Second, this article addresses 
the concept of inclusionary zoning as a potential remedy for the construction 
of new affordable or workforce housing by placing the burden on the land 
development community as a condition or conditions for land development 
approval. This article concludes that while discrimination in housing has been 
well addressed by the courts, providing a remedy even when the government 
does not intentionally discriminate against potential poor residents on the basis 
of race, religion, handicapped or family status, the use of inclusionary zoning 
presents clear problems under the US Constitution despite the occasional support 
from a few state courts. 
II. The Problem: Discrimination in the United States 
A. Government-sponsored segregation: 
discriminatory ordinances 
Following the Great Migration of African Americans from rural counties to cities 
at the turn of the century, and fearing their increasing purchasing power, concerned 
white homeowners turned to their local governments to prevent integration of 
their neighbourhoods. l Many local governments responded by enacting residential 
segregation ordinances.2 Typically, these ordinances either: 
"(1) prohibited whites from moving to all-Negro blocks and Negroes from 
moving to all-white blocks; (2) divided the city into segregated districts 
and designated a district for each race; or (3) restricted new residences 
in mixed blocks to the racial group which had established most of the 
residences on the block".3 
1 See generally David E Bernstein, "Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v Warley in 
Historical Perspective" (1998) 51 Vand L Rev 797, 835 (discussing the prevalence of discriminatory 
ordinances during the migration of Mrican Americans to the North). 
2 See Josh Whitehead, "Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Strike Down Exclusionary Zoning Codes" 
(2005) 33 Real Est LJ 359,362-363. 
3 Bernstein "Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk" (u.l). 
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In 1910, Baltimore became the first municipality to enact such an ordinance, 
preventing African Americans from moving onto blocks with a white majority and 
vice versa. 4 The following was stated purpose of the ordinance: 
"preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white 
and colored races in Baltimore, and promoting the general welfare of the 
city by providing, so far as practicable, for the use of separate blocks by 
white and colored people for residences, churches and schools".5 
By 1912, Mooresville and Winston-Salem, North Carolina had passed similar 
ordinances. 6 By 1913, Asheville, North Carolina; Richmond, Virginia; Norfolk, 
Virginia; Roanoke, Virginia; Atlanta, Georgia; Madisonville, Kentucky and 
Greenville, South Carolina had followed suit. 7 By 1916, the popularity of segregation 
ordinances had also reached Birmingham, Alabama; Louisville, Kentucky; 
St Louis, Missouri and New Orleans, Louisiana. 8 The prevalence of these ordinances 
persisted until 1917, when the US Supreme Court decided Buchanan v Warley9 and 
invalidated this thinly veiled form of state-sponsored discrimination. 10 
B. Segregation by contract: restrictive covenants 
From 1917, when Buchanan v Warley was decided, until 1948, racially restrictive 
covenants became the primary legal mechanism for perpetuating segregation. 11 
Typically, under these covenants, property owners would warrant not to sell or 
lease real property to "any person not of the Caucasian race". 12 Racially restrictive 
covenants were exceptionally effective during this time because "Lochner-
era13 courts consistently enforced them, contributing to the dramatic increase in 
residential segregation during the first half of the 20th century". 14 
4 See Tom C Clark and Philip B Perlman, Prejudice and Property: An Historic Brief against Racial 
Covenants (Washington DC: Public Mfairs Press, 1948) p.ll (originally submitted as amicus brief in 
Shelley v Kraemer 334 US 1 (1948)). 
5 Baltimore, MD, Ordinance 692 (15 May 1911); see also Garrett Power, "Apartheid Baltimore Style: 
The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913" (1983) 42 Md LRev 289, 289, for an in-depth 
discussion on the Baltimore ordinance and other similar ordinances. 
6 See Whitehead, "Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Strike Down Exclusionary Zoning Codes" (n.2). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 245 US 60 (19l7). 
10 Ibid., 74-75. 
11 See Clark and Perlman, "Prejudice and Property" (n.4) p.11. 
12 See "Constitutional Law. Equal Protection of the Laws. Judicial Enforcement of Racial Restrictive 
Covenants Is State Action Prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment" (1948) 61 Harv LRev 1450, 1450. 
13 Named after Lochner v New York 198 US 45 (1905), the "Lochner-era" refers to the period of time 
between 1897 and 1937 during which the Supreme Court utilised a broad interpretation of due process 
that protected economic rights, tended to strike down economic regulations of working conditions, wages 
or hours in favour of laissez-faire economic policy. 
14 Davidson M Douglas, "Contract Rights and Civil Rights" (2002) 100 MichLRev 1541,1561. 
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This fonn of discrimination was not wholly private, either. As one commentator 
explains, "[i]t is virtually impossible to overstate the significance of [the federal 
government's] involvement in creating, sponsoring, and perpetuating the racially 
segregated dual housing markets that divide America". 15 For example, the Federal 
Housing Administration actively promoted the use of racially restrictive covenants, 
frequently refusing to provide its mortgage insurance or guarantees unless the 
covenants were attached to the deeds. 16 The widespread acceptability of racially 
restrictive covenants was substantially abdicated in 1948, when the US Supreme 
Court handed down its landmark decision in Shelley v Kraemer,!7 holding that 
judicial enforcement of the covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 
C. The battles of today 
As the preceding discussion indicates, by 1948, both discriminatory ordinances and 
racially restrictive covenants had been outlawed by the Court. The discriminatory 
intent behind these mechanisms is patently obvious. Present-day housing segregation, 
however, is perpetuated by more subtle means. Indeed, since the FHAI9 was enacted, 
courts have accepted disparate impact claims20 challenging a wide range of practices, 
including zoning ordinances,21 administration of section vouchers,22 lending 
practices,23 mortgage insurance policies,24 landlord and housing provider reference 
policies,25 occupation restrictions26 and the demolition of subsidised housing.27 
III. Fair Housing and Discrimination in Housing 
A. TheFHA 
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA "following the urban unrest of the mid-1960s and 
the chaotic aftennath of the assassination of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr".28 
15 John 0 Calmore, "Spatial Equity and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the Futnre Essay" 
(1993) 7l NC LRev 1487, 1509. 
16 Ibid., 1509-1510 (outlining how the discriminatory policies of the Federal Housing Administration and 
VA significantly transformed the nation's patterns of homeowners hip along racial lines). 
17 Shelley v Kraemer (n.4). 
18 Ibid., 20. 
19 42 USC, § 3601 (1988). 
20 See Gallagher v Magner 619 F 3d 823,833-834 (8th Cir 2010); see Disparate impact defined in Calif Fair 
Housing and Public Accommodation, s.5 :6. 
21 See Huntington Branch, NAACP v Town of Huntington 844 F 2d 926, 937-938 (2d Cir 1988). 
22 See Graoch Associates #33, LP v Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Commission 508 
F 3d 366, 376-377 (6th Cir 2007). 
23 See Miller v Countrywide Bank, NA 57l F Supp 2d 251,258 (D Mass 2008). 
24 See National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc v Prudential Insurance Co of America 208 F Supp 2d 46, 63 
(DDC 2002). 
25 See Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc v Edgewater Park Owners Coop, Inc No 1O-CV-912 (RPP), 2012 
WL 762323, [lO]-[ll] (SDNY 9 March 2012). 
26 See United States v Tropic Seas, Inc 887 F Supp 1347, 1360 (D Haw 1995). 
27 See Charleston Housing Authority v US Department of Agriculture 419 F 3d 729, 749-742 (8th Cir 2005). 
28 HR Rep No 7l1, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 15 (1988). 
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The FHA's goal is to provide, "within constitutional limitations, fair housing throughout 
the United States".29 Congress believed that the FHA's proscription of discriminatory 
housing practices would "remove the walls of discrimination which enclose minority 
groups"30 and "replace ghettos with truly integrated and balanced living patterns".3l 
The thrust of the FHA is found within its two primary substantive provisions. 
First, 42 USC §3604(a) makes it unlawful "to refuse to sell or rent after the making 
of a bona fide offer, or refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make 
available or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status or natural origin".32 Second, 42 USC § 3606(b) makes it unlawful to 
"discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in the connection 
therewith".33 
The FHA protects the following classes and no others (in particular, there is no 




(4) Sex (but not sexual orientation). 
(5) Family status: This class protects primarily parents with children under 18 
years from discrimination. This includes foster families and recipients of 
aid to families with dependent children. Licensed, age-restricted elderly 
living communities are exempt from compliance with this provision. It 
does not ban housing in favour of households with children. 35 
(6) National origin. 
(7) Handicapped status: a physical or mental impairment, which substantially 
limits one or more of such persons' major life activities, a record of such 
impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment. 36 It does not 
include current, illegal use of or addition to a controlled substance, but it 
does include past drug or alcohol addictions and human immunodeficiency 
virus infections.37 This class protects not only persons with disabilities but 
also persons associated with disabled persons. 38 Handicapped conditions 
not considered disabilities under the FHA include emotional disturbance, 
homelessness, history of abuse,39 postincarceration half-way houses4o 
29 42 USC § 3601 (1988). 
30 114 Cong Rec 9563 (1968) (Statement of Rep Celler). 
31 114 CongRec 3422 (1968) (Statement of Sen Mondale). 
32 42 USC § 3604(a) (1988). 
33 Ibid.,§ 3606(b). 
34 Ibid.,§ 3604. 
35 Ibid., § 3602(k); § 3607(b). 
36 Ibid., § 3602(h). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., § 3604(f)(I)(c). 
39 See Sunderland Family Treatment SenJices v City of Pasco 903 P 2d 986, 991 (1995). 
40 See Oxford Investments, LP v City of Philadelphia 21 F Supp 3d 442 (ED Pa 2014). 
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or juvenile delinquency. The FHA prohibits a refusal to pennit, at the 
expense of the handicapped person, reasonable modifications of existing 
premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such modifications 
may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises. 41 
Such modifications include installation of ramps, railings and so forth, 
at the expense of the disabled person, though the landlord may require 
restoration of the alterations to the condition that existed prior to the 
making of the alterations. 42 The FHA also prohibits refusing to make 
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies and practices or services 
when such accommodation may be necessary to afford a disabled person 
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 43 Since this applies to both 
private and public rules, it applies for homeowners association rules, 
condominium association rules, apartment policies, zoning and building 
and housing codes. 44 
A "dwelling" under the FHA is any building, structure or portion thereof which 
is occupied as a residence by one or more families and any vacant land which 
is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such 
building, structure or portion thereof. 45 It is illegal under the FHA to refuse to sell 
or rent after the making of a bona fide offer or to refuse to negotiate for the sale 
or rental of, or otherwise make available or deny, a dwelling. 46 Zoning or building 
regulations are especially vulnerable. Besides local governments (including local 
government services and public utilities), private landowners, real estate agents, 
mortgage lenders and landlords must also comply.47 
Against the backdrop of nine circuit courts of appeals having already found 
claims of disparate impact cognisable,48 Congress revisited the FHA in 1988, 
adding several significant amendments. First, Congress granted HUD authority to 
adjudicate housing discrimination claims49 and to promulgate regulations necessary 
to effectuate the FHA's goals. 50 Second, Congress created three exceptions to 
liability, clarifying that the FHA does not prohibit (1) "conduct against a person 
41 42 USC § 3604(f)(3)(a) (1988). 
42 See Shelton v Waldron No 3-12-0688, 2013 WL 5938016, [3] (MD Tellll5 November 2013). 
43 42 USC § 3604(f)(3)(b) (1988). 
44 See United States v Youritan Construction Co 370 F Supp 643,648 (ND Cal 1973), aff'd in part, remanded 
in part, 509 F 2d 623 (9th Cir 1975). 
45 42 USC § 3602(b) (1988). 
46 Ibid., § 360(4). 
47 See generally NAACP v Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 817 F 2d 149, 152 (1st Cir 1987). 
48 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Texas Department of Housing 
and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project No 13-1371,2014 WL 7336683, [23] (US, filed 
28 October 2013) [US Brief Supporting Respondents rCP] (outlining the controlling disparate impact 
cases in the II circuits). 
49 See 42 USC § 3612 (1988). 
50 Ibid., § 3614(a). 
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because such person has been convicted ... of the illegal manufacture or distribution 
of a controlled substance";51 (2) "reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions 
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling"52 or 
(3) "a person engaged in the business of furnishing appraisals of real property to 
take into consideration factors other than race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
handicap, or familial status".53 These amendments have been widely interpreted as 
presupposing the existence of disparate impact liability. 54 
B. Discriminatory intent 
In 1976, the US Supreme Court decided Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp, holding that the US Constitution's Equal Protection 
Clause provided relief in cases involving discrimination in housing if, but only if, 
the plaintiff alleging discrimination can demonstrate that the defendant local or 
state government intends to discriminate against the plaintiff.55 Disproportionate 
impact alone would be insufficient. 
In 1971, the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) 
sought rezoning of a IS-acre parcel of land in the village of Arlington Heights, 
Illinois, from a single-family zoning classification to a multiple-family zoning 
classification. 56 With the aid offederal financial subsidies provided under s.236 of 
the National Housing Act, MHDC planned to construct 190 townhouse units in 20 
two-story townhouse buildings: 100 single-bedroom units for senior citizens and 
90 two, three, and four-bedroom units for families with low or moderate incomes. 57 
The development was to be called Lincoln Green. 58 
Following a recommendation of the Arlington Heights Plan Commission, 
the Village Board of Trustees denied the zoning request. 59 MHDC and other 
named plaintiffs sued in federal district court alleging that the denial was racially 
discriminatory in violation of the 14th Amendment and the FHA. 60 The district 
court upheld the Board of Trustee's decision but was reversed by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in June 1975, which was, in tum, reversed by the US 
Supreme Court. 61 
51 Ibid., § 3607(b)(4) (1995). 
52 Ibid., § 3605(c) (1988). 
53 Ibid. 
54 See, eg, Transcript of Oral Argnment at 9-12, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs 
v Inclusive Communities Project 135 S Ct 46 (2014) (No 13-137l) (where Scalia J asked the Solicitor 
General of Texas, Scott Keller, why the amendments don't "kill" TDHCA's case; Solicitor Keller did not 
appear to provide Scalia with a satisfying answer). 
55 429 US 252, 265 (1977). 
56 Ibid., 254. 
57 Ibid., 257. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 258. 
60 Ibid., 258-259. 
61 Ibid., 259. 
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The Village of Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago located approximately 
26 miles northwest of downtown. 62 It is primarily a bedroom suburb, zoned largely 
for single-family detached houses. 63 According to the 1970 census, the village 
population was 64,000, of whom only 27 were black. 64 The 15 acres in question were 
owned by the Clerics of St Viator, part of an 80-acre parcel just east of the centre 
of the village. 65 While part of the site was occupied by St Viator's High School and 
a three-story novitiate building, much of the site was vacant. 66 The entire site and 
all of the surrounding area was zoned R-3, single-family detached. 67 Single-family 
homes abut the property on two sides; on the other two sides is the vacant St Viator 
property.68 The proposed l5-acre development would have maintained much of 
the open space, with shrubs and trees screening the homes directly abutting the 
property, but would have required rezoning to the R-5 multiple-family classification 
to permit townhouses at the density proposed. 69 
During the spring of 1971, the village plan commission considered the proposal 
at three public meetings. At the hearings, MHDC submitted studies demonstrating 
the need for housing of the type proposed. 70 Evidence offered at trial indicated 
that many of those attending the plan commission were vocal and demonstrative 
in opposition to Lincoln Green, while others testified in its favour.71 Some of the 
comments from both opponents and supporters of the rezoning petition addressed 
the "social issue" of introducing low- and moderate-income housing that would 
probably be racially integrated into Arlington Heights.72 Ultimately, the Court 
found that most of the opponents focussed on the zoning aspects of the petition, 
stressing the single-family character of the neighbourhood, the reliance by 
neighbouring citizens upon that character and, perhaps most important, Arlington 
Heights' policy concerning multiple-family zoning. 73 Adopted by the village board 
in 1962 and amended in 1970, the policy was that R-5 zoning should constitute a 
buffer between single-family and commercial, industrial, or other high-intensity 
land uses. 74 Lincoln Green did not meet this requirement, since the property is 
completely surrounded by single-family zoned property.75 







69 Ibid., 256. 
70 Ibid., 257. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 258. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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Relying primarily on its decision in Washington v Davis,16 decided after the 
Seventh Circuit's decision but before oral argument in Village of Arlington Heights 
v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, the Court reiterated that official 
action would not be held unconstitutional solelybecause it resulted in a racially 
disproportionate impact. 77 In as plain words as can be imagined, the Court held: 
"Proof or racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause".78 Absent such a showing, the Court said that 
the Seventh Circuit's finding of a "discriminatory 'ultimate effect' is without 
independent constitutional significance". 79 
If, then, secretive motive rather than discernible effect is the critical factor, 
how is that motive to be shown? The court offered five possible approaches. 
First, the Court suggested that while racial impact is not the ultimate test, proof 
of racial impact may in some cases be helpful in proving the required racial 
motive: "Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation 
appears neutral on its face".8o However, it is clear that the pattern must be 
"stark" and that "impact alone is not determinative"Y 
Second, the Court suggested that motive might be demonstrated by a historical 
background, which "reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes".82 Apparently, however, the Court was not persuaded by the type 
of historic pattern of inaction and indifference to segregation found by the 
Seventh Circuit. 83 
Third, the Court said that the specific sequence of events leading to the challenged 
decision may be persuasive of racial motive if it betrays a departure either from 
normal procedures or from substantive standards usually considered important.84 
Fourth, if contemporaneous statements of the decision makers reveal racial 
motive, which would be relevant. 85 However, statements of citizens addressing 
the decision makers seem, if relevant at all, to carry much less weight. 
76 426 US 229 (1976). 
77 Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp (n.55), 265. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 271. 
80 Ibid., 266. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 267. 
83 See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp v Village of Arlington Heights 517 F 2d 409,415 (7th Cir 
1975) (discussing in detail the history of housing segregation in the Chicago metropolitan area). 
84 Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Housing Development Corp (n.55), 267. 
85 Ibid., 268. 
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Finally, the Court said: "In some extraordinary instances the members might 
be called to the stand at trial to testifY concerning the purpose of the official 
action, although even then such testimony frequently will be barred by 
privilege".s6 The remedy, therefore, absent a showing of discriminatory intent, 
is discriminatory impact under the FHA. The usual way of showing such 
impact is by showing disparate impact on a protected class. 
C. Disparate impact and its emergence under the FHA 
The Supreme Court has previously recognised, and upheld, disparate impact claims 
under a number of statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII),S7 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)8s and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).s9 The origins of disparate impact claims can be traced 
to the Court's decision in Griggs v Duke Power CO.90 In Griggs, an employer 
implemented new policies requiring prospective employees (or current employees 
seeking to transfer departments) to have a high school education and to pass two 
professionally prepared aptitude tests to be eligible for employment. 91 While the 
new policies were facially neutral, the Court nevertheless found that they violated 
Title VII because of the long history of African Americans receiving inferior 
education92 and because the employer failed to establish that either requirement 
had a demonstrable relationship to successful job performance. 93 
Griggs v Duke Power Co provided the analytical framework for the Eighth 
Circuit's 1974 decision in United States v City of Black Jack, Missouri,94 which 
signalled the emergence of disparate impact claims under the FHA. In Black Jack, the 
court considered whether a zoning ordinance that prohibited the construction of new 
multi-family dwellings violated the FHA.95 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district 
court's determination that the ordinance did not have a discriminatory effect, holding 
that the court failed to take into account "either the ultimate effect or the historical 
context of the city's actions".96 Having found that the plaintiffs established a prima 
facie case of disparate impact,97 the Eighth Circuit shifted the burden to the city to 
demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a compelling governmental 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Griggs v Duke Power Co 401 US 424 (1971). 
88 See Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi 544 US 228, 234 (2005). 
89 See Raytheon Co v Hernandez 540 US 44 (2003). 
90 Griggs v Duke Power Co (n.87). 
91 Ibid., 427 (the new policies, however, did not apply to the company's labonr department). 
92 The Conrt cited its prior decision in Gaston County, North Carolina v United States 395 US 285 (1969), 
where it struck a literacy test required for voter registration because of North Carolina's long history of 
providing inferior education in its segregated schools. 
93 See Griggs v Duke Power Co (n.87), 431. 
94 508 F 2d ll79 (8th Cir 1974). 
95 Ibid., ll82. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., ll86 (the court found the plaintiff's prima facie case was satisfied upon showing that exclusion of 
multifamily dwelling would "contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in [the city]" .). 
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interest. 98 The court ultimately invalidated the ordinance, finding that there was no 
factual basis to support the citys assertion that its proffered interests were furthered 
by the ordinance.99 
Subsequent to United States v City of Black Jack, Missouri, the remaining 10 
circuit courts of appeal similarly recognised that claims of disparate impact were 
cognisable under the FHA. It was not until 2015, however, that the US Supreme 
squarely addressed the validity and limitations of such claims. 100 
D. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc 
(i) Background and lower court decisions 
In March 2008, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc (ICP) filed suit against the Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs TDHCA in the US District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas, alleging, inter alia, discrimination under the FHA.101 
ICP is a non-profit organisation dedicated to achieving racial and socioeconomic 
integration in the Dallas metropolitan area.102 In pursuit of these lofty goals, ICP 
helps low-income, predominately African American families who are eligible for 
Dallas' subsidised voucher programme to find affordable housing in predominately 
Caucasian, suburban neighbourhoods. 103 TDHCA is the agency vested with the 
responsibility of administering the federal government's Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits (LIHTC) programme in Texas. 104 Under the LIHTC programme, the federal 
government provides tax credits to developers of low-income housing, which 
developers can then sell to finance construction of the low-income projects. !Os 
98 Ibid., 1185. 
99 Ibid., 1187. 
100 Inclusive Communities Project marked the third time since 2011 that the US Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine whether disparate impact claims were cognisable under the FHA. In both 
previous instances, the cases were settled prior to oral arguments. Settlement in at least one of the cases 
resulted from increased apprehension by the Justice Department and numerous civil rights groups that 
the Court was poised to strike down disparate impact under the FHA. See, eg, Hans A Von Spakovsky 
and Michael Flynn, "Last-Minute Settlement Saves 'Disparate Impact' - Again" NATIONAL REVIEW 
(1 November 2013, 5:51 PM), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comer/362917/Iast-minute-
settlement-saves-disparate-impact-again-hans-von-spakovsky-michael-flynn 
101 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc v Texas Dep'tofHous and CmtyAfJairs 860 F Supp 2d 312,313-314 
(ND Tex 2012) (Inclusive Communities Project 1). 
102 According to its website, ICP "works for the creation and maintenance of thriving racially and 
economically inclusive communities, expansion of fair and affordable housing opportunities for low 
income families, and redress for policies and practices that perpetuate the harmful effects of discrimination 
and segregation", available at http://www.inclusivecommunities.neti(visited 19 February 2015). 
103 See Inclusive Communities Project I (n.101), 314. 
104 See Tex Gov't Code § 2306.053(b)(1O). ("The department may ... administer federal housing, community 
affairs, or community development programs, including the low income housing tax credit program.") 
105 See 26 USC § 42(c) (2013). ("The number of credits TDHCA may award for a low-income housing 
project is determined by calculating the project's 'qualified basis', which is a fraction representing the 
percentage of the project occupied by low-income residents multiplied by eligible costs.") 
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In its complaint, ICP alleged that TDHCA had been improperly exercising 
its discretion in making decisions regarding the allocation of the tax credits.106 
According to ICP, TDHCA was allocating the credits in a manner that had 
a discriminatory effect on African American residents. 107 Specifically, ICP 
asserted that TDHCA had been disproportionately approving tax credit units for 
developments in predominantly minority neighbourhoods and disproportionately 
disapproving tax credit units for developments in predominantly Caucasian 
neighbourhoods. !Os The consequence, according to ICP, was the continued 
concentration of affordable units in minority neighbourhoods, a lack of such 
units in Caucasian neighbourhoods; and, therefore, a perpetuation of the housing 
segregation that the FHA seeks to end. 109 
In March 2012, the district court found that ICP had succeeded in proving 
its disparate impact claim under the FHA, although it failed on its claims of 
intentional discrimination. llo On appeal, the Fifth Circuit's review was limited to 
a single issue: "whether the district court correctly found that ICP proved a claim 
of violation of the [FHA] ... based on disparate impact".lll To decide whether ICP 
had in fact proved a disparate impact claim, the Fifth Circuit had to determine the 
appropriate standard for establishing liability. However, subsequent to the district 
court's decision, HUD had issued its regulations, discussed more fully in Section 
III(E), codifying disparate impact under the FHA.ll2 Adopting HUD's burden-
shifting approach, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the 
case for application given its "demonstrated expertise with [the] facts".ll3 However, 
on 2 October 2014, the US Supreme Court granted TDHCA's petition for writ of 
certiorari, which presented to the Court the question of whether disparate impact 
claims were even cognisable under the FHA.ll4 
(ii) Supreme court decision: disparate impact saved? Maybe 
On 25 June 2015, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Inclusive 
Communities. ll5 That the Court found disparate impact claims cognisable under 
the FHA is no particular surprise since 11 federal circuit courts of appeals had 
previously done so, and itself had similarly done so in cases brought under the 
106 See Inclusive Communities Project I (n.lOl), 317. 
107 Ibid., 322. 
108 See Inclusive Communities Project, Inc v Texas Dep t ofHous and CmtyAjJairs 747 F 3d 275,278 (5th 
Cir 2014) [Inclusive Communities Project II] cert granted in part, 135 S Ct 46, 189 (2014). 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Inclusive Communities Project I (n.lOl), 319-320. 
ill Inclusive Communities Project II (n.108), 278. 
112 See Inclusive Communities Project II (n.108), 274. 
113 Inclusive Communities Project II (n.108), 282. 
114 See Texas Dep't ofHous & Cmty AjJairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc (n.54). 
115 135 S Ct 2507 (2015). 
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ADEA, ADA and VII cases. ll6 What is particularly significant, however, is the 
likely lasting effect the Court's decision will have on the ability of plaintiffs to 
prevail on such claims. 
Generally speaking, substantiating a violation of the FHA through a disparate 
impact claim involves a three-prong analysis: 
First, the plaintiff must show that a policy or practice has a disparate impact 
on a class of persons protected under the FHA: race, religion, national origin, 
family status and handicapped status. 
Second, the defendant must be given an opportunity to rebut the charge 
of discrimination by demonstrating that the practice or policy is not for 
discriminatory purposes, but for a benign and neutral public goal or purpose or 
policy, such as protection of the health, safety and welfare of the community. 
Third, the plaintiff alleging discrimination may still succeed if the plaintiff can 
show there are other, less burdensome methods to accomplish the benign and 
neutral goals the defendant claims for the purposes of the challenged public 
policy.ll7 
Kennedy J's opinion in ICP concentrated primarily on the first prong, under which 
a plaintiff essentially must set out a prima facie violation of the FHA. 
First, he stated that there would be no liability for govermnent if the challenge 
and allegation of disparate impact are based solely on a showing of statistical 
disparity.lls Second, that statistical disparity must also fail if plaintiffs cannot point 
to a policy of the offending government, rather than a simple instance of an action 
which has such a statistical disparate impact. ll9 The court said that "racial imbalance 
alone does not without more establish a prima facie case of disparate impact" and 
"fiscal disparity must fail if plaintiff cannot point a defendant's policy causing 
disparity".12o The court characterised this as a "robust causality requirement".121 
The court distinguished between "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers", 
which should be struck down under disparate impact analysis, and "displacement 
of valid governmental policies", which should not. 122 
In considering the second and third prongs, the Court said that it would be 
"paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs on actors who encourage 
116 Griggs v Duke Power Co (n.87); Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi (n.88); Raytheon Co v Hernandez 
(n.89). 
117 See Inclusive Communities Project II (n.108), 282. 
118 See Texas Dept of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc (n.115), 2522. 
119 Ibid., 2523 (citations omitted). 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., 2522. 
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revitalization of dilapidated housing merely because some other priority might 
seem preferable". 123 
According to Kennedy J: 
"disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key 
respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that might arise 
under the FHA, for instance, if such liability were imposed based solely on 
a showing of a statistical disparity". 124 
Further, "[ d]isparate-impact liability mandates the 'removal of artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers,' not the displacement of valid governmental policies". 125 
Accordingly, "[t]he FHA is not an instrument to force housing authorities to reorder 
their priorities, [but rather,] aims to ensure that those priorities can be achieved 
without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation".126 
Similarly, "[i]t may also be difficult to establish causation because of the multiple 
factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct or renovate 
housing units ... "127 
In summary, Kennedy J has hedged the Court's confirmation of the use of 
disparate impact analysis under the FHA with so many caveats that it would likely 
make it more difficult to mount and win a disparate impact discrimination case 
after the Court's analysis than before. In particular, his robust causality, policy-only 
and cautionary quotas language significantly changes the relatively straightforward 
disparate impact test crafted by most of the federal circuit courts which had 
previously approved of the test. Subsequent cases from district courts around the 
country confirm that it has indeed become more difficult to mount and win such 
cases, largely based on the Kennedy cautionary language. 
(iii) Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive 
Communities on remand and rehearing 
The district court's treatment ofInclusive Communities on remand from the Supreme 
Court best illustrates how lower courts are construing Inclusive Communities as 
elevating the burden for plaintiffs, particularly at the prima facie stage. Prior to the 
Fifth Circuit's and Supreme Court's decisions, the district court had granted ICP 
partial summary judgment, finding it had sufficiently established a prima facie case 
of disparate impact. 128 On remand from the Supreme Court, however, the district 
123 Ibid., 2512. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 2522. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 2523-2524. 
128 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc v Texas Dep t of Hous & Cmty Affairs 749 F Supp 2d 486, 500 (ND 
Tex 2010). 
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court found it necessary to reconsider whether ICP had established a prima facie 
case, noting that it had previously done so "without the benefit of the Supreme 
Court's opinion".129 
Relying upon Kennedy's J "cautionary language", the district court concluded 
that it had not previously "give[n] the primafacie requirement the same emphasis 
the Supreme Court had given it".130 The court noted that, while it had not relied 
solely on evidence of statistical evidence alone, many of the other sources ICP cited 
also largely relied upon statistical evidence, and thus the court arguably had "not 
analyze [ d] ICP's evidence through the prism of the 'robust causality requirement' 
envisioned by the Supreme Court".l3l 
The court further emphasised that TDHCA also did not have the benefit of 
the Supreme Court's decision. 132 Noting that TDHCA "essentially d[id] not contest 
ICP's prima facie case", the court concluded that "TDHCA should be permitted 
to challenge ICP's prima facie showing based on a clearer understanding of the 
requirements and consequences of ICP's establishing a prima facie case".133 
Consequently, "the interests of justice and fundamental fairness require[d] not 
only that ICP's disparate impact claim be decided anew under the burden-shifting 
regimen adopted by HUD and the Fifth Circuit, but that the court start with whether 
ICP has established a prima facie case".134 
On rebriefing and a fresh round of oral arguments, the impact of Kennedy J's 
opinion became even more apparent when the district court held that ICP had failed 
to establish a prima facie violation of the FHA and dismissed the entirety ofICP's 
disparate impact claim. 135 In fact, the court's decision was not simply based on a 
single deficiency in ICP's claims, but rather, a wholesale failure to satisfy the newly 
informed disparate impact standard. 
First, the court found that ICP "failed to point to a specific, facially neutral 
policy that purportedly caused a racially disparate impact".136 Specifically, "[b]y 
relying simply on TDHCA's exercise of discretion in awarding tax credits, ICP 
has not isolated and identified the specific practice that caused the disparity in 
the location of low-income housing".137 Rather, ICP relied upon the "cumulative 
effects" ofTDHCA's decision-making process over a multiyear period, and similar 
129 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc v Texas Dep t of Hous & Cmty Affairs No 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2015 
WL 5916220, [3] (ND Tex 8 October 2015). 
130 Ibid., [3] (in its order granting partial summary judgment, the district court had previously stated that 
"rcP's prima facie burden is not a heavy one", explaining that "rcp need only provide evidence that 
raises an inference of discrimination" because "we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors". (citation omitted). 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., [4]. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Inclusive Communities Project, Inc v Texas Dep't of Hous & Cmty Affairs, No 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 
WL 4494322, [1] (ND Tex 26 August 2016). 
136 Ibid., [6]. 
137 Ibid. 
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such arguments have been rejected as insufficient to underlie disparate impact 
claims in other contexts. 138 
The court noted that ICP's failure to identify a specific, facially neutral policy 
also became apparent when considering what potential remedy would be available 
in the event that ICP were to prevail. According to the court, Kennedy J's opinion 
requires that "[r]emedial orders in disparate-impact cases ... concentrate on the 
elimination of the offending practice, and courts should strive to design race-
neutral remedies", and lower courts should be careful not to "impose racial targets 
or quotas," because doing so "might raise difficult constitutional questions".139 
In other words, "[t]o remedy disparate impact, the court must craft a race-neutral 
remedy that removes the offending practice". 140 Yet, "[a ]lthough ICP complains of 
TDHCA's exercise of discretion in housing decisions, it does not ask the court to 
prohibit TDHCA from using its discretion; rather, it asks the court to require that 
TDHCA exercise its discretion in a specific way: to desegregate housing". 141 Such 
a remedy, therefore, would not be race neutral. 
Second, the court also concluded that ICP's claim must be dismissed because, 
"regardless of the label ICP places on its claim, it is actually complaining about 
disparate treatment, not disparate impact". 142 As the court explained, "[w]here the 
plaintiff establishes that a subjective policy, such as the use of discretion, has been 
used to achieve a racial disparity, the plaintiff has shown disparate treatment".143 
Therefore, because ICP was not complaining of the existence of TDHCA's 
discretion, but rather how TDHCA was exercising such discretion, its claim was 
actually one of disparate treatment. 144 
Third, the court further reasoned that, even if TDHCA's use of its discretion 
is a specific, facially neutral policy, ICP nevertheless failed to establish a causal 
relationship between the exercise of that discretion caused racial disparity 
complained of.145 Noting that Kennedy J cautioned that "[i]t may be difficult [for 
ICP] to establish causation because of the multiple factors that go into investment 
decisions about where to construct or renovate housing units[,]" the court concluded 
that "ICP ha[d] not proved that TDHCA's exercise of discretion-and not other 
factors-caused the statistical disparity". 146 
138 Ibid. (citing Anderson v Douglas & Lomason Co 26 F 3d 1277, 1283-1285 (5th Cir 1994) (an 
employment discrimination case where the plaintiff nnsuccessfully asserted that the cumulative effects 
of the defendant's employment practices caused a racial disparity in promotions). 
139 Ibid. (citing Inclusive Communities (n.1l5), 2512). 
140 Ibid., [7]. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
143 Ibid. (citing Johnson v Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Counry 2008 WL 3163531, 
[4-6] (MD Tenn 4 August 2008)). 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., [8]. 
146 Ibid., [9] (alterations in original). 
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Finally, further buttressing its conclusion, the court explained that, even if ICP 
was able to establish that a specific, facially neutral policy caused the disparity it 
complained of, ICP failed to prove a statistically significant disparity warranting 
the imposition of FHA liability. 147 Simply put, the court concluded that the evidence 
ICP submitted failed to prove that the statistical disparity would have been lessened 
ifTDHCA did not exercise the discretion that ICP's claim targeted. 
(iv) Other cases focusing on ICP's cautionary language 
The decisions of a significant number of courts that have confronted FHA disparate 
impact claims subsequentto the Supreme Court's decision in Inclusive Communities 
similarly demonstrate that plaintiffs now must carry undeniably heighted burdens 
simply to proceed past the prima facie stage. Generally, plaintiffs' claims in these 
cases fail for one or more of the following reasons: (1) failure to satisfy the robust 
causality requirement;148 (2) inadequate evidence to demonstrate a statistical 
disparityl49 and (3) failure to identifY a specific, facially neutral policy. 150 
Perhaps the most frequently identified deficiency is the failure to satisfY 
Kennedy J's "robust causality" requirement. For example, in Azam v City of 
Columbia Heights/ 51 the plaintiff alleged that the city's enforcement of its health 
and safety codes with respect to his rental properties "ha[ d] the effect of making 
affordable rental dwellings unavailable ... [resulting in] a disparate impact [on] 
persons intended to be protected by the [FHA ]".152 In granting the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a 
prima facie case of disparate impact, particularly the "robust causality requirement" 
and, in any event, failed to submit an alternative practice with a lesser impact. 153 
With regard to a failure to proffer sufficient evidence demonstrating a statistical 
disparity, City of Los Angeles v Wells Fargo & CO l54 is illustrative. In that case, the city 
147 Ibid., [10]. 
148 See De Reyes v Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd P 'ship No 1: 16-CV-563, 2016 WL 4582049 (ED Va 1 
September 2016). 
149 See City of Miami v Wells Fargo & Co No 13-24508-cry, 2016 WL ll56882 (SD Fla 17 March 2016). 
150 See City of Joliet, Illinois v New Tv, LP 825 F 3d 827 (7th Cir), cert denied sub nom; Mid-City Nat Bank 
of Chicago v City of Joliet, III 137 S Ct 518 (2016). 
151 No CV 14-1044 (JRT/BRT), 2016 WL 424966, [1] (D Minn 3 February 2016). 
152 Ibid., [10] (some alterations in original). 
153 Ibid., [ll]; see also Ellis v City of Minneapolis, No 14-CV-3045-SRN/JJK, 2015 WL 5009341, [1] 
(D Minn 24 Augnst 2015) (finding that, even if plaintiff statistically demonstrated disparate impact, 
it nevertheless failed to satisfy the "robust causality requirement"); De Reyes v Waples Mobile Home 
Park Ltd Partnership (n.148), [6] (plaintiff's claims challenging mobile home park's newly instituted 
identification policy failed to satisfy robust causality requirement); Cobb Cty v Bank of Am Corp 183 F 
Supp 3d 1332, 1347 (ND Ga 2016) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate causal connection between lender's 
lending practices and alleged disparity); City of Miami v Wells Fargo & Co (n.149), [5] (city failed 
to meet ICP's '''robust causality requirement', which requires the City to 'allege facts at the pleading 
stage ... demonstrating a causal connection' between the challenged policy and the alleged statistical 
disparity"). 
154 No 213CV090070DWRZX, 2015 WL 4398858, [1] (CD Cal 17 July 2015). 
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alleged that Wells Fargo's issuance of "high-cost loans", ie, loans with an interest rate 
three per cent points or more above the federally established benchmark, was having 
a disparate impact on racial minorities. 155 The city submitted evidence demonstrating 
that while a Hispanic Wells Fargo borrow has a 0.0033 per cent likelihood of receiving 
a high-cost loan and a similarly situated African American Wells Fargo borrower had 
a 0.0067 per cent likelihood of receiving a high-cost loan, a similarly situated non-
Hispanic white borrower faces only a 0.0008 per cent likelihood of receiving a high-
cost 10an.156 While the court noted its cognisance that evidence is not to be weighed at 
summary judgment, it was also mindful that the Court's "recent guidance in Inclusive 
Communities precludes the City's statistical disparity evidence from creating a 
genuine dispute regarding a prima facie case".157 Therefore, the court concluded that 
the "difference between 0.0033 percent and 0.0008 percent does not create a genuine 
dispute such that a jury must decide this issue", and "comparing thousandths of a 
percentage fails to meet the minimum threshold of Inclusive Communities".158 
Similar to the district court on rehearing in Inclusive Communities, in City 
of Joliet, Illinois v New W, LP, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for, inter alia, failing to identifY a 
specific, facially neutral policy.159 In that case, the city commenced condemnation 
proceedings against an allegedly dilapidated, crime-ridden apartment complex that 
was comprised of approximately 95 per cent African Americans. 160 Noting Inclusive 
Communities' caution that "a one-time decision may not be a policy at all", the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the "district court's findings ... that the condemnation of 
[the complex wa]s a specific decision, not part of a policy to close minority housing 
in Joliet".161 The court further noted that "governmental entities ... must not be 
prevented from achieving legitimate objectives" and that the city's condemnation 
was in furtherance goals approved by the court in Inclusive Communities. 162 
E. Affirmative fair housing 
Affirmatively providing fair housing is required of recipients of federal funds 
under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 163 In particular, 
the grantee of such funds must certify that the grant will be conducted and 
administered in conformity with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the FHA and that 
the grantee will affirmatively further fair housing. 164 This section discusses HUD's 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., [7]. 
157 Ibid., [8]. 
158 Ibid.; see also Texas Dept of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc 
(n.ll5),2524. 
159 City of Joliet, Illinois v New Tv, LP (n.150), 830. 
160 Ibid., 829. 
161 Ibid., 830. 
162 Ibid. 
163 42 USC § 5301. 
164 Ibid., § 5304(b)(2). 
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implementation of the FHA's Discriminatory Effects Standard promulgated by a 
final rule, 24 CFR Pt.lOO. 
A local-government applicant for HUD housing funds has always had to prepare 
consolidated plans, an analysis of impediments to fair and affordable housing in its 
jurisdiction, and certify that the grant recipient will affirmatively further fair housing 
as required by the FHA. Following United States ex reI Anti-Discrimination Ctr of 
Metro New York v Westchester County,l65 these requirements have been increased 
and tightened. In Westchester County, the county was found to have made a false or 
fraudulent claim because it had not sufficiently analysed racial discrimination as an 
impediment to fair housing and had not taken steps to require production of affordable 
housing in certain municipalities in the county.166 The county settled by paying a $62 
million fine, constructing 750 units of affordable housing in non-minority areas and 
undertaking affirmative marketing of such affordable units. As a result of this litigation, 
the affirmative obligations ofHUD affordable housing funds recipients are as follows: 
(1) Define affirmatively furthering fair housing and related terms. 
(2) Make a new assessment of fair housing process and tools. 
(3) Focus on patterns of segregation compared to prior regulatory regime. 
(4) In particular, focus on the effect of regulations like zoning codes on 
affordable housing. 167 
There is an increasing overlap between fair housing and affordable housing. 
Local government/municipal actions that have the effect of reducing the supply of 
affordable housing are increasingly vulnerable to claims that such actions have a 
disparate impact on a protected class of persons under the Inclusive Communities 
(and other federal circuit court cases) standards. l68 Thus, for example, women, 
ethnic and racial minorities and persons with disabilities can all be defined as 
comparatively low-income wage earners. Therefore, so the reasoning goes, making 
it difficult for these groups to find affordable housing can be construed as having 
a disparate impact on a protected class. 169 In the context of local land use controls 
like zoning, the following either drive up the cost of housing and/or prevent the 
construction of affordable housing in a municipality: 170 
(1) Minimum lot size. 
(2) Minimum house size. 
165 668 F Supp 2d 548 (2009). 
166 Ibid., 562-565. 
167 See County of Westchester v US Department of Housing and Urban Development 802 F 3d 413,419 (2d 
Cir 2015). 
168 See generally Southern Burlington County NAACP v Mount Laurel Twp 456 A 2d 390 (1983). 
169 See generally Christopher Serkin and Leslie Wellington, "Putting Exclusionary Zoning in Its Place: 
Mfordable Housing and Geographical Scale" (2013) 40 Fordham Urb LJ 1667, 1671. 
170 See Note, "Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection" (1971) 84 HalV L Rev 1645. 
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(3) Restrictions on multifamily development or density. 
(4) Restrictions on manufactured housing. 
(5) Costly design and site development standards (landscaping, open space/ 
side-front yards, expensive materials). 
(6) Restrictions on group living arrangements for FHAA-protected classes, 
like spacing requirements, special or conditional permit requirements and 
development or service standards. 
IV. Inclusionary Zoning: Mandatory Set-Asides or 
Quotas of Affordable, Workforce Housing as a Land 
Development Condition 
As the costs of providing affordable, workforce housing increase and the burdens 
upon local government of providing such housing using federal (RUD) funds, 
together with the risk of compliance failure as noted in Section II also increases, 
the trend towards obtaining such housing from private sector land developers as 
conditions for development approval also increases.l7l Such mandatory affordable 
housing requirements are subject to the standards set out by the US Supreme Court 
in a series of three cases decided between 1987 and 2015, none of which deal with 
affordable housing requirements per se.172 As a result, some state supreme courts 
have decided that the federal standards set by the US Supreme Court do not apply 
to mandatory fair/affordable housing quotas. 
A. The federal cases 
While much of the recent case law dealing with such conditions and exactions has 
developed from challenges to impact fees, the language is applicable to all three. 
To be enforceable and valid, an impact fee must be levied upon a development to 
pay for public facilities, the need for which is generated, at least in part, by that 
development. 173 This is the so-called rational nexus test developed by the courts 
in Florida and other jurisdictions that have considered such fees and exactions. 174 
171 See generally Michael Floryan, "Cracking the Foundation: Highlighting and Criticizing the Shortcomings 
of Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning Practices" (2010) 37 Pepp L Rev 1039, 1048. 
172 Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987); Dolan v City of Tigard 512 US 374 (1994). 
173 David L Callies, Robert H Freilich and Thomas E Roberts, Cases and Materials on Land Use (St Paul, 
MN, USA: Thompson West Publishing Co, 6th ed., 2012), Chapter 4; Julian Conrad Juergemueyser, 
Funding Infrastructure: Paying the Costs of Growth Through Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation 
Charges edited by James C Nicholas (Chicago: Planners Press, 1985); Brian W Blaesser and Christine 
M Kentopp, "Impact Fees: The Second Generation" (1990) 38 Wash UJ Urb & Contemp L 28; David L 
Callies, "Impact Fees, Exactions and Paying for Growth in Hawai'i" (1989) II U Haw L Rev 295. 
174 See, eg, Hernando County v BudgetInns of Florida Inc 555 So 2d 1319 (FlaDist CtApp 1990); Frisella 
v Town of Farmington 550 A 2d 102 (NH 1988); Baltica Constr Co v Planning Bd of Franklin Twp 537 
A 2d 319 (NJ Super Ct App Div 1987); Batch v Town of Chapel Hill 387 SE 2d 655 (NC 1990); 
Unlimited v Kitsap County 750 P 2d 651 (Wash CtApp 1988). 
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First proposed in 1964,175 it became the national standard by the end of the 1970s.176 
The test essentially has two parts. First, the particular development must generate 
a need to which the amount of the exaction bears some rough proportionate 
relationship. Second, the local government must demonstrate that the fees levied 
will be used actually for the purpose collected. 177 
This test was made applicable to all land development conditions by the US 
Supreme Court in 1987. Decided on the last day of the Court's 1987 term, Nollan 
v California Coastal Commission l78 deals ostensibly with beach access. Property 
owners, James and Marilyn Nollan, sought a coastal development permit from the 
California Coastal Commission to tear down a beach house and build a bigger 
one. The commission granted the permit only upon condition that the owners give 
the general public the right to walk across the owners' backyard beach area in 
the form of an easement over one-third of the lot's total area. The purpose, the 
commission said, was to preserve visual access to the water, which was impaired 
by the much bigger beach house. The Court, however, held that, assuming the 
commission's purpose to overcome the psychological barrier to the beach created 
by overdevelopment was a valid public purpose, it could not accept that there was 
any nexus between that interest or purpose and the public lateral access or easement 
condition attached to the permit. 179 
The Court stated, however, that it is an altogether different matter if there is 
an "essential nexus" between the condition and what the landowner proposes to 
do with the property.180 Thus, local governments must consider several important 
factors when levying impact fees: 
(1) The fees must generally be charged as part of the land development process, 
not the land reclassification or rezoning process. Fees are development 
175 Ira Michael Heyman and Thomas K Gilhool, "The Constitutionality ofImposing Increased Community 
Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions" (1964) 73 Yale LJ Ill9; see also 
Fred P Bosselman and Nancy Stroud, "Legal Aspects of Development Exactions" in Frank and Rhodes 
(ed), Development Exactions (Chicago: Planners Press, 1987). 
176 See Bosselmanand Stroud, "Legal Aspects" (n.175), p.74. 
177 Fred P Bosselman and Nancy E Stroud, "Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development 
Linkage" (1985) 9 Nova L Rev 381, 397-399; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v Twp of Holmdel 583 
A 2d 277 (NJ 1990). 
178 Nollan v California Coastal Commission (n.ln). 
179 Ibid., 838-839. For full discussion, see J David Breemer, "The Evolution of the 'Essential Nexus': 
How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here" 
(2002) 59 Wash & Lee L Rev 373. 
180 Nollan v California Coastal Commission (n.ln), 836-837; see also Callies, Freilich and Roberts, Cases 
and Materials on Land Use (n.173); Bosselman and Stroud, Mandatory Tithes (n.I77); Brenda Valla, 
"Linkage: The Next Stop in Development Exactions" (1987) 2 Growth Mgmt Stud Newsl 4; Callies, 
"Impact Fees" (n.173); Jerold S Kayden and Robert Pollard, "Linkage Ordinances and Traditional 
Exactions Analysis" (1987) 50 L & Contemp Probs 127; Rachelle Alterman, "Evaluating Linkage and 
Beyond" (1988) 32 Wash UJ Urb & Contemp Probs 127. But see Holmdel Builders Ass'n v Twp of 
Holmdel (n.I77) (upholding impact fees for housing as functional equivalents of mandatory set-asides, 
which the court had already approved under New Jersey's constitutionally based "fair share" doctrine). 
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driven, and land reclassification, while it may well be a prelude to 
development, does not create any need for public facilities whatsoever. lSI 
(2) Collected fees do not belong to the general fund, or the need IS 
questionable. ls2 
(3) The fees cannot be kept by government indefinitely, or the need IS 
questionable. 
Ignoring the foregoing raises a presumption, as a matter of both law and policy, that 
the impact fee is nothing more than a revenue-raising device, either for a facility 
that has nothing to do with the land development upon which the fee is raised or for 
undetermined fiscal purposes generally. In either case, the "fee" is then presumed 
to be a tax. This characterisation as a tax is almost always fatal to an impact fee 
since most local governments have very little specific authority to tax beyond the 
property tax and, occasionally, a sales or income tax.IS3 Because an impact fee is 
none of the above, and because all local government taxes must be supported by 
specific statutory authority, the fee is almost always declared illegal. IS4 
The Court in Nollan v California Coastal Commission did not discuss the 
required degree of connection between the exaction imposed and the projected 
impacts of the proposed development. This issue was left open until 1994 when the 
Supreme Court decided Dolan v City of Tigard. IS5 In this 5-4 decision, the Court 
held for the first time that a city must demonstrate a "reasonable relationship" 
between the conditions imposed on a development permit and the development's 
impact. ls6 
Florence Dolan owned a plumbing business and electrical supply store located 
in the business district of Tigard, Oregon, along Fanno Creek, which flowed through 
the southwestern comer of the lot and along its western boundary. Dolan applied to 
the city for a building permit to double the size of the store and pave the 39-space 
parking lot. To mitigate for increased runoff from her property that would result 
from her expansion plans, the commission required that Dolan dedicate to the city 
the portion of her property lying within the 1 OO-year flood plain along F anno Creek 
for a public greenway. To mitigate for increased traffic and congestion caused by an 
increase in visitors to her store, the commission also required that Dolan dedicate 
an additional15-foot strip of land adjacent to the flood plain as a public pedestrian 
and bicycle pathway. 
181 Although in California such fees are charged when land is rezoned to planned unit development, a 
special zone in most jurisdictions, often carrying with it developmental rights. 
182 See Brown v Cty of Harry 417 SE 2d 565,568 (1992). 
183 See generally Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure (n.173). 
184 See, eg, Home Builders Ass'n of Cent Ariz, Inc v Riddel, 510 P 2d 376 (Ariz 1973); Town of Longboat 
Key v Lands End Ltd, 433 So 2d 574 (FlaDist CtApp 1983); Lafferty v Payson City, 642 P2d 376 (Utali 
1982). See generally Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure (n.173). 
185 Dolan v City of Tigard (n.ln). 
186 Ibid., 390. 
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While in Dolan v City of Tigard, there was a clear nexus between the impact 
of the proposed development and the conditions required by the commission, the 
Supreme Court adds a second test beyond "nexus"; whether the degree or amount 
of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions were sufficiently 
related to the projected impact of the development proposed. The Court coined 
the term "rough proportionality" to describe the required relationship between the 
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development. 187 While "[ n]o 
precise mathematical calculation is required ... the city must make some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development". 188 
The Court reviewed the exactions (the two required dedications of the public 
greenway and the pedestrian and bicycle pathway) and found that the city's burden 
on the development was not roughly proportional to the adverse effects of the 
development would create. Therefore, the exactions were unconstitutional. 
Together, Nollan v California Coastal Commission and Dolan v City of Tigard 
require that to pass constitutional muster, land development conditions imposed by 
government must: 
(1) seek to promote a legitimate state interest; 
(2) be related to the land development project upon which they are being 
levied by means of a rational or essential nexus; and 
(3) be proportional to the need or problem which the land development project 
is expected to cause, and the project must accordingly benefit from the 
condition imposed. 
Under the first standard, legitimate state interest, an agency may only require a 
landowner to dedicate land (or interests in land) or contribute money for public 
projects and purposes, such as public facilities and, in most jurisdictions, public 
housing. 
Under the second standard, essential nexus, an agency must find a close 
connection between the need or problem generated by the proposed development and 
the land or other exaction or fee required from the landowner or developer. Thus, for 
example, a residential development will in all probability generate a need for public 
schools and parks. A shopping centre or hotel in all probability will not. Both will 
generate additional traffic and therefore generate a need for more streets and roads. 
Under the third standard, proportionality, a residential development of, say, 
300 units may well generate a need for additional classroom space, but almost 
187 Ibid., 391. Mter coining the term "rough proportionality", the Court, in its majority opinion, never used 
that term again when it applied its decision to the facts; instead it continued to use the words "required 
reasonable relationship" or "reasonably related". Notably, the Court rejected stricter standards as the 
constitutional norm. See Herron v Mayor of Annapolis, 388 F Supp 2d 565, 570-57l (D Md 2005). 
188 Dolan v City of Tigard (n.ln), 391. 
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certainly, not a new school or school site. On the other hand, such a residential 
development of several thousand units would, when constructed, likely generate a 
need for a new school and school site, depending on the demographics of the new 
residents. 
More recently, the US Supreme Court decided in Koontz v St Johns River Water 
Management District, holding that both Nollan v California Coastal Commission 
and Dolan v City of Tigard nexus and proportionality requirements apply to 
monetary exactions like mitigation fees, in-lieu fees and impact fees, as well as 
government-required dedication of land or interests in land (like easements ).189 
Thus, for example, a government could constitutionally require a land owner to 
provide a public school site or in-lieu fee as a condition for approval of a large 
residential development or a fee representing a development's fair share of the 
cost of such a school site on a small residential development. However, it could 
not require either a site or a fee from a commercial centre development for lack of 
a nexus: commercial developments do not drive a need for schools, but residential 
developments do. 
(i) A constitutional issue: nexus 
Because impact or "linkage" fees for affordable or workforce housing are a form of 
exaction, they are subject to the "essential nexus" takings test of Nollan v California 
Coastal Commission. 190 Under Nollan: 
"a permit condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose 
as a refusal to issue to permit should not be found to be a taking if the 
refusal to issue to permit would not constitute a taking". 191 
In addition, under Nollan, the government bears the burden of proving this nexus. 192 
Linkage fees satisfy this test "only if the municipality can show that development 
contributes to the housing problem 193 the linkage exaction is intended to remedy". 194 
189 133 S Ct 2586 (2013). 
190 Nollan v California Coastal Commission (n.ln), 837; see Commercial Builders ofN Cal V Sacramento 
941 F 2d 8n, 874 (9th Cir 1991). 
191 Nollan v California Coastal Commission (n.ln), 836 (emphasis added). 
192 Dolan v City of Tigard (n.ln), footnote 8 (citing Nollan v California Coastal Commission (n.ln), 836). 
193 MandeJker, Land Use Law (5th ed., 2003), Section 9.23. A "housing problem" is the typical interest 
which the counties of Hawai'i identify as a legitimate state interest in their ordinances. See, eg, Maui, 
Haw, Code, § 2.94.010 (2007) ("The council finds that there is a critical shortage of affordable housing 
in the county."); Hawai'i, Haw, Code, § ll-2(5)(201O) (setting forth the objective of "Requir[ing] large 
resort and industrial enterprises to address related affordable housing needs as a condition of rezoning 
approvals, based upon current economic and housing conditions"). InAss'n of Owners v Honolulu 742 
P 2d 974 (Haw Ct App 1987), the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i acknowledged the 
legitimacy of this interest in the context of the challenge to a condominium declaration, stating that 
"affordable housing and public parking for downtown Honolulu were important to the welfare of the 
community". Ibid., 985. 
194 MandeJker, Land Use Law (n.193). 
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There is no disagreement in federal courts that Nollan's nexus test, or its close 
equivalent, applies to linkage fees. For example, in Commercial Builders of Northern 
California v City of Sacramen to , 195 the Ninth Circuit held that an ordinance which 
imposed a linkage "fee in connection with the issuance of permits for nonresidential 
development of the type that will generate jobs"196 (in other words, a workforce 
affordable housing requirement) was constitutional under Nollan v California 
Coastal Commission. 197 Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance directly on Nollan 
grounds: lack of nexus or connection between the development and the affordable 
housing condition. First, the court addressed the holding of Nollan. Nollan holds that 
where there is no evidence of a nexus between the development and the problem 
that the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld. 198 The court then 
explained that "the [0 ]rdinance was implemented only after a detailed study revealed 
a substantial connection between development and the problem to be address".199 
The Court related at some length what the City of Sacramento did to establish 
the "substantial connection between the development and the problem" of 
affordable housing.20o First, it commissioned a study of the need for low-income 
housing, the effect of non-residential development on the demand for such housing 
and the appropriateness of exacting fees in conjunction with such developments to 
pay for housing: 
"[The study] estimat[ ed] the percentage of new workers in the developments 
that would qualifY as low-income workers and would require housing. [The 
study] also calculated fees for development ... Also as instructed, however, 
in the interest of erring on the side of conservatism in exacting the fees, it 
reduced [the] final calculation[] by about one-half. Based upon this study, 
the City of Sacramento enacted the Housing Trust Fund Ordinance [which] 
... included the finding that nonresidential development is 'a major factor in 
attracting new employees to the region' and that the influx of new employees 
'creates a need for additional housing in the City.' Pursuant to these findings, 
the Ordinance imposes a fee in connection with the issuance of permits for 
nonresidential development of the type that will generate jobS".201 
Consequently, the court found "that the nexus between the fee provision here at 
issue, designed to further the city's legitimate interest in housing, and the burdens 
caused by commercial development is sufficient to pass constitutional muster".202 
195 See Commercial Builders ofN Cal V Sacramento (n.190). 
196 Ibid., 873 (emphasis added). 
197 Ibid., 875. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid., 857. 
201 Ibid., 873. 
202 Ibid., 875. 
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B. The state cases 
Nevertheless, there are a few state cases upholding inclusionary housing 
programmes. 
In Home Builders Ass 'n of Northern California v City of Napa,203 the city 
enacted an inclusionary zoning ordinance requiring 10 per cent of all newly 
constructed units be affordable, but again only after the city made significant 
findings and studied possible affordable housing solutions, much like the city 
of Sacramento.204 Moreover, the court specifically recognised that "The City's 
inclusionary zoning ordinance imposes significant burdens on those who wish 
to develop their property".205 Therefore, the court noted specifically that "the 
ordinance also provides significant benefits to those who comply with its terms ... 
expedited processing, fee deferrals, loans or grants and density bonuses".206 The 
municipality provided over 700 pages of documentation for its program and set its 
required set-aside at only 1 0 per cent. 
Also, in June 2015, the California Supreme Court rendered its decision 
in California BUilding Industry Ass 'n v City of San Jose, which upheld a city 
inclusionary zoning ordinance requiring that 15 per cent of the dwelling units in a 
new development be set-aside for affordable or workforce housing. 207 Alternatively, 
the landowner could construct affordable units off-site equal to 20 per cent of the 
total projected market-rate units or pay an in-lieu fee. 20s While the decision only 
applies to California, the case has been widely reported in national media. 
The California Supreme Court specifically held that nexus and proportionality 
do not apply to mandatory affordable housing requirements. 209 Instead, the court 
agreed with the lower court of appeals that since California's planning statutes 
require each local government to formulate a comprehensive plan and to include 
an affordable housing element, the San Jose ordinance was not different from any 
zoning ordinance regulation like use, yard and set-back regulations.2lO Moreover, 
the court further held that the mandatory housing requirement was no more than the 
equivalent of a rent-controlled ordinance most of which have been approved where 
litigated, especially in California. 211 
The court's demonstrated that ignorance of basic zoning law - indeed local 
land-use controls generally - is breathtaking. Zoning ordinances are regulatory: 
They prevent certain uses or limit the size of permitted structures through bulk 
203 108 Cal Rptr 2d 60 (CtApp 2001). 
204 Ibid., 62. 
205 Ibid., 64. 
206 Ibid. 
207 California Bldg IndusAssn v City ojSanJose 351 P 3d 974 (2015), cert denied sub nom; California Bldg 
Indus Ass 'n v City oj San Jose, Calif 136 S Ct 928 (2016). 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid., 991. 
211 Ibid. 
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requirements such as height, setback and yard maximums and minimums. By 
contrast, the mandatory workforce housing requirement in San Jose requires 
a landowner to affirmatively provide a public need or benefit - affordable 
housing - just as other land development conditions require water and sewer 
systems, roads, schools, parks, and other public facilities, provided the development 
drives a need for them. There is no such need for affordable housing driven by or 
caused by a residential development for market-rate housing. 
Moreover, these decisions must be read in the context of California's Density 
Bonus Law which requires local governments to "reward developers that agree to 
build a certain percentage of low-income housing" with increased density bonuses 
above those permitted by applicable local regulations.212 While the Density Bonus 
Law can, by itself, be considered a voluntary inclusionary zoning programme, these 
density bonus mandates are then tacked on to those already provided by a local 
government's inclusionary zoning programme.213 Therefore, developers building 
in jurisdictions that impose inclusionary zoning ordinances have a state guaranteed 
avenue to mitigate the burdens of providing affordable housing required by local 
governments, and nonetheless, developers who build in jurisdictions without 
inclusionary zoning programmes have incentives to build affordable housing. 
California Code s.69l5 requires local governments to provide applicants who 
"seek and agree to construct a housing development" containing at least 5 per cent 
of the units affordable to very low-income households or 10 per cent of the units 
affordable to lower-income households with at least a 20 per cent density bonus.214 
Developers may also set aside 10 per cent moderate-income affordable units but 
will only receive a 5 per cent density bonus.215 In order to create better incentives 
for developers to produce affordable housing, the Density Bonus Law offers 
increased density bonuses on a sliding scale for developers who meet and surpass 
the minimum set-aside requirements.216 Depending on the type of affordable unit 
set-aside, developers will receive a higher percent density bonus for every percent 
increase in affordable housing they offer above the minimum threshold. The 
developer will earn an increased density bonus of 2.5 per cent for every per cent of 
very low-income housing set-aside, 1.5 per cent for every per cent oflower-income 
housing set-aside and 1 per cent for every per cent of moderate-income housing set 
aside.217 These density bonuses are capped at 35 per cent. Thus, a developer who 
sets aside 11 per cent of the development's units for very low-income units, 20 
per cent lower-income units or 40 moderate-income units will earn the maximum 
density bonus.218 Although the mandatory density bonus award under the state's 
212 Shea Homes LP v Cnty of Alameda 2 Cal Rptr 3d 739 (Ct App 2003). 
213 Barbara A Kautz, A Public Agency Guide to California Density Bonus Law (2005). 
214 Cal Gov't Code § 65915(b)(I)(West 2008). 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid., § 65915(f). 
217 Ibid., § 65915(f)(1)-(4). 
218 Ibid. 
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Density Bonus Law is capped at 35 per cent, this maximum cannot be "construed 
to prohibit a [local government] from granting a density bonus greater" than that 
required by state law. 219 
California Code s.659l5 also requires local governments to provide developers 
who meet the aforementioned minimum set-aside requirements with incentives 
or concessions that "result in identifiable, financially sufficient, and actual cost 
reductions".22o These concessions and incentives include, but are not limited to, 
(1) reductions in development standards, (2) modifications of zoning or building 
code requirements and (3) "approval of mixed use zoning in conjunction with the 
housing project" if it is compatible with the project and will reduce costs.221 Local 
governments are required to provide developers with one concession or incentive 
for every 10 per cent of the total units dedicated to lower-income households, 
5 per cent to very low-income households or 10 per cent to moderate-income 
households. 222 However, a developer may only receive up to three concessions or 
incentives. 223 
V. Conclusion 
Federal remedies for housing discrimination have a long history in the United States. 
After the US Supreme Court required a showing of intentional discrimination as a 
prerequisite for a Constitutional challenge, the emphasis for challenging housing 
discrimination shifted to the federal FHA. In a series of federal appellate court 
decisions over the past 40 years, the courts established the theory of disparate 
impact: no need to show intent to discriminate but only that the complained of 
action has a discriminatory effect on a class (race, religion, gender, family status, 
disabilities) protected by the FHA. It is not particularly surprising, therefore, 
that the US Supreme Court in the recent Inclusive Communities case upheld the 
theory. However, the Court hedged its application with so many conditions and 
expressed so many concerns that were arguably more difficult for plaintiffs alleging 
discrimination to succeed, than it was before the Court weighed in. Such difficulty 
is apparent in the wave of federal district (trial court) cases approving government 
actions and dismissing discrimination claims over the past two years, led by the 
Texas federal district court's decision in Inclusive Communities on remand from 
the US Supreme Court, to reverse its previous finding of discrimination after the 
"guidance" from the US Supreme Court. 
The situation places increased importance on other ways of providing 
affordable housing. One such attempt by government is to require or mandate 
219 Ibid., § 65915(n). 
220 Ibid., § 65915(k). 
221 Ibid., § 65915(1). 
222 Ibid., § 65915(d)(2). 
223 Ibid. 
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a percentage of any approved market-price housing development for affordable 
or workforce housing. While the goal is laudable, the process cannot withstand 
scrutiny under the US Constitution. Conditions on development must be connected 
(a nexus) proportionately to public needs generated by that development. Building 
market-rate housing does not drive a need for affordable housing, although certain 
types of commercial development requiring the employment of an economically 
disadvantaged workforce might. While attempts to mitigate the burden on land 
development caused by such affordable housing such as density bonuses on tax 
incentives may well ease the economic effect of such conditions on the land 
development community, it does not change the unconstitutional nature of the 
exaction. It simply makes it less likely that the exaction will be challenged in the 
court. 
